The weakness of states and the porous nature of borders, whose traced lines are as disputed as they are disputable, all contribute to transforming what begin as localized wars in Africa into regional conflicts.
Even if the case of the Central African Republic (CAR), a former French colony, is not that of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DR Congo), where every issue is magnified by the sheer size of the country, what is at stake in the French military intervention in CAR goes beyond a strict national boundary. While all of CAR’s neighbouring countries have good, and even very good, relations with France, adding the ingredient of a French military intervention to the cauldron of the CAR has all the potential of either precipitating more trouble there or, on the opposite, of maintaining the bad practices that have long blighted it. It is far from certain that the French presidency, which appears to have approached the intervention in solely military terms, and not political, has properly measured the risks it now runs.
“The Central African Republic is not a country, it’s the annexe of its neighbours who use it to export their problems,” commented a former minister of CAR, whose name is withheld, speaking in the capital Bangui last month. Of the six countries that border CAR, four are home to longstanding bitter conflicts (Chad, Sudan, South Sudan and DR Congo), while the other two are ruled by ageing dictators (Paul Biya in Cameroon and Sassou Nguesso in the Congo). All of them, with the possible exception of the young state of South Sudan, have autocratic regimes whose leaders are more interested in helping their own personal condition than in good governance and the development of their respective countries.
Enlargement : Illustration 1
To different degrees, these neighbours of CAR all have to deal with rebellions that threaten their central powers – and which they are well pleased to ‘export’ over the border to CAR to give themselves some relief at home. But there are also economic arguments behind this. “[Chadian President Idriss] Déby’s administration draws most of its wealth from Southern Chad, an oil-producing region that straddles the border with CAR,” commented David Smith, a director of Okapi Consulting, a South African-based organisation dedicated to promoting the development of independent local media and networks in Africa. “Chad is happy as long as oil is not coming out of the ground in CAR and as long as Séléka and Chadian rebels keep a reign of instability that prevent oil to be pumped. As far as Sudan is concerned, Khartoum faces a loss of oil revenues since south Sudan gained independence. The CAR could potentially offer Khartoum a new revenue stream through oil, diamonds, gold and timber as well as an opportunity to expand Muslim influence in the region.”
Countries are also taking advantage of the absence of industry and infrastructures in the CAR in order to get their hands on natural resources, whether this be through direct access to them across the border, or by organizing illegal smuggling (notably of diamonds).
“The coup d’état [in the CAR] in March 2013 like that in 2003 are regional coups d’état,” commented Roland Marchal, a researcher with the Paris-based Centre for International Studies and Research (Centre d’études et de recherches internationals), the CERI. “Is it legitimate that the heads of state in the region decide who should preside over a neighbouring country?”
In 2003, like in 2013, it was Chadian President Idriss Déby who was behind the coup d’état in CAR, backed by his regional colleagues, as is detailed in a 2007 report by the International Crisis Group. “In N’Djamena, President Idriss Déby, who had just denounced “a manhunt” and even a “plan to exterminate Chadians” at the time of the government’s counter-offensive in northern CAR placed personnel from his “Force 4” Presidential Guard at Bozizé’s disposal," the report states. "Joseph Kabila, head of state of Congo-Kinshasa, supplied the necessary armaments; and his neighbour on the other bank of the Congo, President Denis Sassou Nguesso, funded the operation to the tune of 3 billion FCFA (about €4.6 million). President Omar Bongo of Gabon, the most senior figure in the region, only gave his blessing at the last minute, because he doubted the capacity of Bozizé, who he had known a long time. However, at the insistence of his wife Edith, daughter of President Sassou Nguesso, he overcame his reluctance.”
Enlargement : Illustration 2
The same process occurred in 2012, when the so-called ‘old crocodile’ leaders of the region remained the same, with the exception of Omar Bongo, the late Gabonese president, who had been replaced by his son Ali. They had all ran out of patience with Bozizé who had let his country slip into turmoil, with increasing rebellions, while he reneged on agreements made with his opponents. In December that year, the Séléka, an alliance of opposition movements established in northern CAR, was ready to march to the capital Bangui with the help of mercenary soldiers from Chad and Sudan. But Idriss Déby did not give his authorisation for them to move. Bozizé, who had long enjoyed Chadian backing, negotiated an agreement in the Gabonese capital Libreville, under the auspices of Omar Bongo and a Congolese mediator.
But within a few weeks it became apparent that Bozizé had no intention of honouring the deal. Idriss Déby then gave the Séléka the green light to move onto Bangui which they overran in just a few days causing Bozizé to flee to safety in Cameroon.
It was of no surprise that the Multinational Force of Central African States (FOMAC), present in CAR at the time with the mission of stabilising the country, allowed the Séléka to take power: its troops are made up of contingents from Chad, Congo, Gabon and Cameroon, neighbours of CAR which had decided who should lead it. “They want to sort the problem out as a family, but they are incapable,” said one expert analyst of the region, who asked for his name to be withheld. “With each new intervention, they destabilize the Central African Republic a bit more, up to a point of no return that was reached this year.”
'They won't be harassed about democracy and human rights'
Roland Marchal, researcher with the CERI, believes France then had two options. “Paris could have said that it was not for the region to choose the president of CAR, even if Bozizé was a crook, and withdraw,” he said. “Or it could have decided to stay, deciding to speak with greater strength, including to Déby. But to do that, it was necessary to take an interest in CAR.” Instead, France chose to remain involved in events with a laissez-faire approach. The result was that the Séléka became transformed into a preying militia force and Michel Djotodia, who became CAR president in March this year, was never able to restore order. After just a few months, the humanitarian crisis, fears of the creation of a terrorist sanctuary and religious tensions led France into a more active role, finally resulting in its military intervention with the backing of the UN Security Council.
Diplomatic sources have told Mediapart that the African Union (AU) asked France and the UN to give it a free hand (and financial help) for one year to try and resolve the problems in CAR itself, but the countries in the region were against the idea.
The UN, which has had a presence in CAR for some 15 years, was also incapable of resolving the problems alone. But while France took over the lead role in CAR, it has perhaps not taken true measure of the magnitude of the task and the regional complications that lie ahead. “Today, the international community, France particularly, is looking for an organization to overtake the management of an end to the crisis,” said the expert analyst of the region. “But the choice is between the blind [the AU and the Community of Central African States] and the one-eyed [the UN]. Good sense will tend to choose the one-eyed.”
Enlargement : Illustration 3
Even if the military intervention in CAR becomes in the end a peacekeeping mission under a UN mandate, the neighbouring countries would have to be involved if only to help with the transport of supplies and securing borders. With France leading two simultaneous ongoing operations on the African continent, in Mali and CAR, the old leaders of the region know they can take advantage of the situation, at least in gaining a degree of political tranquility. “They are not going to be harassed about issues of democracy and human rights when one needs their roads or the overfly of their territories,” said a former French diplomat who was involved in the Paris summit earlier this month on peace and security in Africa. “We’re not going to get too angry with Déby, who is playing a perverse game in CAR, when we need his soldiers in Mali.”
“One of the solutions consists of ‘de-regionalising’ the new UN force that will take over from the FOMAC,” said Thierry Vircoulon, a specialist on CAR for the International Crisis Group. “That has begun with the integration of soldiers from Burundi, but Chad will remain onboard the mission because it is necessary to be able to use Déby’s influence over the Séléka.” Thus it is that some geopolitical manoeuvring is in preparation to contain Chad’s ambitions while also being able to count on its help.
But that will not in itself resolve the political problem surrounding CAR, whose neighbours are as incompetent as they are inconsequent. “They are fundamentally military regimes who appoint military staff to do the job of diplomats,” added Vircoulon, referring to various generals from the Congo, Gabon, Cameroon and Chad who fill up the posts of mediators, ambassadors and mission chiefs on the international stage.
To its great detriment, CAR will remain a country encircled by autocratic regimes which have little enthusiasm for a profound reform of affairs in Africa. By intervening in such conditions, without a political preparation on the ground, France has accepted this pernicious game. Even if the French troops do their job well, the CAR’s future is in danger of remaining scuppered by old, established practices.
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English version by Graham Tearse