French President François Hollande and German Chancellor Angela Merkel met in Berlin on Tuesday to celebrate the 50th anniversary of the Elysée Treaty, a milestone reconciliation and cooperation agreement that gave birth to a longstanding diplomatic and cultural alliance.
Signed in 1963 by then-French President Charles de Gaulle and German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, it established the two former foes as the key forces behind the fledgling economic and political project that was to become the European Union.
The celebrations on Tuesday included a cabinet meeting between French and German governments, and a joint session of both countries’ parliaments, hosted by the Bundestag.
But the alliance, often referred to in France as the ‘Franco-German couple’, has been placed under strain in recent years, and notably since the election last year of Hollande who has repeatedly clashed with Merkel over European policies, notably her dogged support for harsh austerity measures and rigorous budgetary discipline.
The significant policy differences between the French socialist president and the centre-right German Chancellor are such that no important initiative was expected to emerge from their meetings on Tuesday.
Étienne François is a German-based French historian and a recognized expert on the history of modern relations between France and Germany. He co-founded the Berlin-based Marc Bloch Franco-German social sciences research centre, which he became a director of, and was also the head French studies at the Free University of Berlin. In this interview with Thomas Schnee, he analyses the state of the current relationship between the two countries, the consequences of their fundamental differences in political culture, and their inability to create an effective defence alliance.
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Mediapart: French President François Holland and German Chancellor Angela Merkel appear to have a more conflicting relationship than those of their predecessors. Does this demonstrate an erosion of the friendship between France and Germany?
Enlargement : Illustration 1
Étienne François: It is a classic situation. When a new partner enters the Franco-German ‘couple’, we see a period of misunderstanding, then comes a phase of compromise, and later even one of complicity. It is quite normal that the new arrival, a president or chancellor, wants to mark a difference with their predecessor, to show originality, and to stamp their ideas. But there is, above all, the force of events, the reality of what’s at stake and the high level of interdependence of interests between our two countries which impose themselves on the one and the other.
Concerning the state of Franco-German friendship, I’d quote here De Gaulle, who reckoned that between two states “there can be no friendship, there are only interests”. It is obvious that neither France nor Germany is masochistic or altruistic to the degree of sacrificing certain interests for the sake of Franco-German ‘friendship’. That’s why I prefer to speak of a Franco-German partnership rather than friendship. To my mind, there is no damage to our relationship.
Simply, as the relationship develops and deepens stage by stage, the relationship becomes a normal one. It is no longer a spectacular one, a larger variety of issues are dealt with, sometimes at an increasingly technical level, and there are compromises reached that are not necessarily dramatic. A daily regularity is reached. It becomes commonplace. But I don’t mean that in a negative sense.
Mediapart: In the relationship between the leaders of the two countries, there is an imagery and a sort of liturgy. Gestures and embraces are closely observed. Is this aspect of the relationship an important one?
E.F.: That depends upon the gesture. It was undoubtedly [former French President Nicolas] Sarkozy who employed this aspect in the relationship the most, with an extreme staging of gestures and physical touching. It was also his way of diverting attention and hiding disagreements. In fact, the Franco-German relationship is so old that it becomes difficult to find any new, significant, symbolic gestures. You can’t twice stand holding hands like [former German Chancellor Helmut] Kohl and [former French President François] Mitterrand did in 1984 at the Douaumont Fort near Verdun.
Then again, I don’t know if we still need these kinds of symbols. Today rather, we expect concrete political progress, one which has a sense and which, while being European, demonstrates Franco-German characteristics. But that is currently difficult, as we have seen in the case of the reactions to the war in Mali.
Mediapart: What reactions?
E.F.: The reactions of European countries to the conflict in Mali show the differences that exist both in the interests, and the military and diplomatic culture of each [European Union] member state. A European defence [policy], which is stalled, is indeed a good example of the difficulties of working together. Normally, France and Germany should enjoy cooperation that is much more developed in this field. However, our armaments industries are in strong competition, and in the case of the Franco-German brigade we know that when French and German soldiers are sent on the ground, they go separately.
It is, in fact, symptomatic to see that in this domain, the French have a better understanding with the English [sic], who are however much less European [-minded] than the Germans. But France and Great Britain have a culture of military intervention that the Germans haven’t. The French President and the English [sic] Prime Minister are also heads of the armed forces and have the right, within certain limits, to engage armed forces without first consulting parliament. In Germany, parliamentary sanction is an absolute requirement.
Mediapart: With the reductions in military spending that have followed the financial and budgetary crisis, the debate about the need to re-launch a common European defence policy has intensified. Has the crisis, in certain respects, had a positive effect on Franco-German relations and the European Union?
E.F.: The extent and gravity of the euro crisis is unprecedented. It has shaken the foundations of Europe. We have never before seen a crisis of the sort. Which also means that we don’t have old remedies with which to respond to it. We therefore need to get to the heart of the issues, put the problems on the table and find new solutions. What’s more, the crisis is not Franco-German [by cause], but France and Germany have a heavy responsibility, like that of being the first not to respect the Maastricht [Treaty’s] criteria. We therefore have an imperative duty to provide a European response, to create something new and solid.
Mediapart: To reform and develop the structures of European governance implies a significant transfer of national sovereignty to a European platform. Are Europe’s nations ready for such a move?
E.F.: We have already begun abandoning significant elements of our sovereignty. In the monetary domain, it is the European Central Bank that runs the show and no longer the Bank of France or the Bundesbank. It is the same thing in other areas, competition, labour laws and so on. I think that at heart, the French and the Germans are not against this on principle. But this partial abandoning has not until now really been admitted to nor responsibility for it assumed. Whereas, if we want to go further, we will need to begin a transfer [of sovereignty] that is done openly and in a manner that is clearly approved of.
There must also be agreement on a European model, and that’s where there’s a shock between cultures. On the question of governance, it is clear that the respective political identities influence the vision of a future Europe, even if the basis of all the European systems of government is profoundly democratic. The French imagine a model of [European] government along the lines of the [French] republican model, with a strong central state and the creation of a Ministry of Economy. The Germans, with their strong parliamentary tradition, insist on a reinforcement of the powers of the European Parliament and less on the creation of a central government.
Mediapart: Does that mean that there must be a true compromise of cultures and national identity?
E.F.: Contrary to popular belief, the concept of national identity is a quite recent one which appeared in political speeches towards the 1980s, at the time when globalization began making itself properly felt. And it is often a concept that is used to serve exclusion, as we saw with the team of [former French immigration minister Eric] Besson, [French presidential advisor Patrick] Buisson and Sarkozy.
Now, there are national traditions that are composed of political identity and which differ significantly. They sometimes resurface in a surprising manner. Thus, the focus on the heritage of the French revolution by a part of the French Left has been clear these past few years. There is a return to revolutionary universalism that is accompanied, by some, with an excluding line of argument along the lines of “we’re the revolutionaries, and so we have no lessons to be given by anyone”. Between the lines, this reads “and above all not the Germans”.
Sarkozy used this maxim in a very explicit way by building up a whole [policy] argument about the defence of French identity.
Mediapart: Is the recognised drop in France and Germany of the numbers learning each other’s language a sign of mutual rejection?
E.F.: I deplore this drop, but it should not be overly interpreted. With globalization, there has been a change of scale that has reinforced the domination of English. In a country like France, which has no bilingual tradition, if one learns a foreign language it is firstly English that one chooses. It is purely pragmatic.
Mediapart: Is France, because of its political culture, less able than Germany to place itself within a European framework?
E.F.: I think so. The true German tradition is federalism. That goes back to the Middle Ages. The two experiences Germany has had of centralised regimes, the Empire and the 3rd Reich, were catastrophes. Now, the federalist way of functioning means that Germany is made up of regions that have powers and budgets much larger than ours [in France]. These regions, the Länders, have learnt to make compromises at a federal level, to live together, all the while maintaining a certain level of independence and quite a strong cultural identity. In fact, they already function along similar rules to those of Europe. For the Germans, the arrival of a European dimension is a bit like adding another stage to their rocket without modifying the fuselage below.
On the contrary, the centralised tradition of France is the republican tradition, with at its centre a state and all its symbolism. The French State is thus the guarantor of unity, of equality, of freedom, in sum, fraternity. If one has a go at that, it is a go against the republic. All our political vision stems from this. Take a comparison, for example, between our respective perceptions of public services. In Germany, public services are public organizations, administrations and a rather unusual professional branch, the civil servants. In France, public services are more than that. They are an institution which carries and defends the values of the French republic.
We see this in primary and secondary school teaching. In France, the [educational] programmes are, of course, national. They are defined and controlled by the state. In Germany, a national programme defined by the state would be considered as an attack on the freedom and rights of the regions. There are only common criteria, in order to allow a comparison of the level of education. But within this wide framework, it is for teachers to define their educational programmes.
Mediapart: Is there cause for concern that this French culture is arguably less adapted to Europe?
E.F.: I’m not worried for the French. They’ll get there alright. But I think we must make more efforts, notably pedagogic. Reinforcing decentralization would be a good thing. There has been enormous progress since the 1982 Deferre [de-centralisation reform] laws. But for the French the most familiar administrative division remains that of the department [Editor’s note: equivalent to a county], whereas the territorial administration best adapted for Europe is without any doubt the region. We must therefore strengthen our [French] regions, to give them more responsibilities and means. That is what the German Länders already have. Their impressive ‘diplomatic’ representations in Brussels demonstrate that they already take to it like fish to water.
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English version: Graham Tearse