Just days after his comments about not ruling out the sending of Western troops “on the ground” in Ukraine, no one is yet sure if Emmanuel Macron was trying to employ the art of 'strategic ambiguity', or whether it was simply an accidental slip. Whatever it was, the result has been a complete fiasco: the French president has been repudiated by his allies, the Ukrainians themselves have shown relatively limited enthusiasm, while Moscow seems to be lapping up the resulting discord.
This outcome is all the more remarkable when one considers that neither Emmanuel Macron nor those who have roundly criticised his comments have taken the trouble to clarify what he was actually talking about. Yet talk of “Western troops on the ground” can cover a range of diverse options, ones with very different consequences for the course of the war – and some of which are already being employed in Ukraine.
Spies and special forces: already there
First of all, having “troops on the ground” could mean soldiers who are there unofficially, whether carrying out clandestine operations (undercover and outside the usual legal framework of war) or simply “discreet” operations (in uniform and supervised from France under the authority of special operations). In France's case the former type of operation is generally undertaken by the operations section of the country's overseas intelligence agency the Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure (DGSE), and the latter by special forces units consisting of personnel from the army, navy and air force.
Yet these two types of mission are already being carried out in Ukraine, and by various Western countries. That “unofficial and unacknowledged [French] forces” are in Ukraine is “a certitude”, said the former French Marines colonel Michel Goya, interveiwed by Mediapart on our RETEX programme on military issues.
Enlargement : Illustration 1
In fact, the main purpose of such units is for them to be present in war zones. In doing so they provide eyes and ears on the ground, and can carry out localised missions to take French citizens to safety or free hostages but on an unofficial basis, so that Paris does not get dragged into the conflict politically or diplomatically. Some recent works of fiction give a general idea of how this works. For though they are fictional accounts they nonetheless contain realistic elements bearing some resemblance to these units' work in practice, whether this be in Syria (in the case of the TV series Cœurs noirs -'Black Hearts' - on special forces) or in Ukraine (in the action thriller 'Sauvez Zelensky' or 'Save Zelensky' written by Vincent Crouzet, a former DGSI agent).
When it comes to clandestine operations, a senior DGSE official recently tacitly accepted what the world already knew. Questioned for a book that came out in February, the administrative director of the French intelligence agency talked about “exceptional operations which justify the use of special funds”. In this context he mentioned “the Ukrainian crisis” during which he explained “we reorganised our department, we called up agents and, as part of this, we mobilised funds”.
I would be more scandalized if it turned out the CIA wasn't busy in Ukraine.
French intelligence agents operating in Ukraine will be working alongside a number of foreign counterparts. In a major investigation which appeared on February 25th, and which was based on 200 interviews, The New York Times revealed the presence on Ukrainian soil of a network of spy bases funded by the US's Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).
Constructed “in the last eight years”, these hubs play an active role in the war against Russia, in particular through eavesdropping and monitoring the skies above Ukraine, insist witnesses to whom The New York Times spoke. “I would be more scandalized if it turned out the CIA wasn't busy in Ukraine,” was the reaction of former CIA analyst Michel Shurkin.
Back in June 2022 the American newspaper had also reported that despite declarations by President Joe Biden that the United States would not send troops to Ukraine, since the start of the war in February 2022 “some CIA personnel have continued to operate in the country secretly, mostly in the capital, Kyiv”.
In addition to spies, several Western countries have also sent special forces to Ukraine. A leak of classified Pentagon documents at the start of 2023 contained details on this. According to some of these leaked documents, quoted by Politico and the BBC , there is a “Europe-heavy special forces group operating in Ukraine - at least as of March 23”. Made up of around a hundred soldiers it included, among others, 50 special forces troops from the UK, 17 from Latvia, 15 from France and 14 from the United States.
These figures have to be treated with caution: while the leak was acknowledged and the author of the leak has been identified, it is known that some of the documents dong the rounds online have been altered, and one has to treat them with caution. But the reaction of several states to the revelations tends to confirm the gist of what they are saying.
Following the leaks the Pentagon admitted in April 2023 that there was a “small US presence” in Ukraine, while insisting that the troops there were “not fighting on the battlefield”. Unlike other countries the United States does sometimes comment on some of their special forces operations. Recently, for example, Washington revealed that American commandos were in Israel.
That is not the case with France, which waited for the deaths of members of French special forces in Libya before admitting the presence of its troops there (having first launched a criminal investigation for “compromising national secrets” against the Le Monde journalist who revealed their presence, Nathalie Guibert). In keeping with this approach, France has thus denied the presence of French special forces in Ukraine. “There are no French forces involved in operations in Ukraine,” the Ministry for the Armed Forces said in April 2023.
Uniformed soldiers to secure embassies: also already happening
That covers unofficial military presence. But it was probably not this that Emmanuel Macron had in mind when he spoke about sending troops to Ukraine: the French head of state was careful to make clear that he was speaking about the idea of sending soldiers in an “official” capacity.
Once again, these words can still cover a multitude of different things, some of which are already being carried out.
Among the sparse details given by Washington about its military presence in Ukraine has been confirmation of some official operations. In November 2022, for instance, the US confirmed the presence of some troops who were not from special forces units. Reacting to messages on social media about “troops on the ground”, the Pentagon stated that there were “small teams that are comprised of embassy personnel that are conducting some inspections of security assistance delivery at a variety of locations”. In other words, they have been checking on the use of American-supplied weapons. But the Pentagon made clear: “...[T]here are no combat forces in Ukraine, no U.S. forces conducting combat operations in Ukraine.”
More recently, and following Emmanuel Macron's declarations, the British government also tacitly conceded that it had a small military presence in Ukraine. A spokesperson for prime minister Rishi Sunak said: “Beyond the small number of personnel we do have in the country supporting the armed forces of Ukraine, we haven't got any plans for large-scale deployment.”
This discreet phrase could be a reference to the presence of some soldiers who guard the British embassy in Kyiv, but also to larger operations. In April 2022 the British press revealed that British army instructors were being sent to train Ukrainian battalions around Kyiv. A few months later a former commandant general of the Royal Marines, Lieutenant-General Robert Magowan, revealed that British commandos had supported “discreet operations” in a “hugely sensitive environment”, in particular in relation to the evacuation of the British embassy in the Ukraine capital.
Sending advisors and deminers, the next step?
An additional step in the Western presence in Ukraine would involve sending military advisors, in an open manner, to support the Ukrainians, for example with logistics. It appears that this is one of the points that has been discussed by Kyiv's partners.
Questioned by the National Assembly's defence and armed forces committee the day after Emmanuel Macron's declarations, France's armed forces minister Sébastien Lecornu explained that some states who were supporting Ukraine militarily had “proposed a certain number of ideas, particular around demining and around the training” of soldiers “on Ukrainian territory behind the lines”. The Élysée told the press: “No one has spoken about the possibility of taking part in the fighting in Ukraine.” It, too, spoke of “demining activities or maintaining operational readiness”.
According to academic Olivier Schmitt, who was interviewed by Libération newspaper, this issue has been under discussion by European countries since last November. “At the minimum it would involve sending troops on the ground for maintenance and logistics. At most it would to help the Ukrainians to identify some targets, for example through the interception of electromagnetic frequencies, to help in the planning or the supply of methods of electronic jamming warfare and detection,” said Olivier Schmit, who teaches international relations at the Centre for War Studies at the University of Southern Denmark.
The real red line: the presence of combat units
Finally, sending “troops on the ground” could in the end refer to two other scenarios, involving much greater commitment and having much greater consequences than technical or logistical assistance. The first scenario would be to send not advisors but combat units and support, with the hope that their presence would dissuade Russian forces from advancing further (this is called conventional deterrence as opposed to nuclear deterrence). The second and even more extreme idea would involve sending these combat units in order to fight against Russian troops.
This latter scenario, if this is what Paris had in mind, would make France a party to the combat. It is highly improbable: Russia, like France, has nuclear weapons and direct confrontation between two nuclear powers is a scenario that the whole world wants to avoid because of the risk of it sliding out of control. Emmanuel Macron understands this, despite the major diplomatic failure of his intervention.
The nuclear powers have thus far taken precautions to ensure that their troops do not face each other on the ground, even in a third country. An illustration of this was when American and Russian troops found themselves on Syrian soil at the same time in 2015 (the former were there as part of an international coalition against Islamic State, the latter to support Bashar al-Assad's regime). Communication channels were put in place in order to avoid any incident between their soldiers. These were what are called 'deconfliction' measures.
Russia, European countries and NATO countries in general don't want open warfare .
The desire to avoid any direct confrontation between NATO and Russia is the reason why it is not NATO itself that is sending lethal aid to Ukraine; the countries that send help are doing so bilaterally. It is also the reason why fears that it was a Russian missile that exploded on Polish soil in November 2022 caused so much anxiety, amid anxiety the situation could escalate - Poland is a NATO member. After an investigation Warsaw and Kyiv came to the conclusion that it was “probably” debris from a Ukrainian air defence missile.
A clash between Western soldiers – whether French, American or from another NATO country – and Russians in Ukraine would “really be the final stage, and in reality no one wants that,” said Michel Goya on Mediapart's 'RETEX' programme. “We have to be clear about this: as things stand, Russia, European countries and NATO countries in general don't want open warfare, because obviously, against a nuclear backdrop, it's a dangerous escalation. We've never done it in the past, we've never dared, and on the face of it we won't do it.”
It was probably with such fears in mind that France's foreign affairs minister Stéphane Séjourné chose to make clear on February 27th that the actions envisaged by those supporting Ukraine, in terms of demining for example, “might necessitate a presence on Ukrainian territory [but] without crossing the threshold into belligerence”.
Today “there's no intention at all to send a French division to fight alongside the Ukrainians,” says Olivier Schmitt. However, that is how several French politicians have interpreted – or have chosen to interpret – Emmanuel Macron's comments. “I'm 27 and I say openly: I don't want to go to the front. I don't want to be part of a new sacrificed generation,” declared Léo Deffontaines, head of the French Communist Party's list of candidates for the European elections in June.
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- The original French version of this article can be found here.
English version by Michael Streeter