'It's the most serious crisis in Franco-Algerian relations since independence'

DuringDuring his first term of office French president Emmanuel Macron entrusted historian Benjamin Stora with the writing of a report on the “memory of colonisation and the Algerian War” to promote “reconciliation between the French and Algerian peoples”. Initially, the academic saw some of the acts of healing that he recommended in his report carried out, such as France’s recognition of its responsibility in the assassinations of Algerian independence activist and mathematician Maurice Audin and prominent nationalist Ali Boumendjel.

The leading French academic subsequently co-chaired a commission of ten French and Algerian scholars on colonialism, alongside Algerian historian Mohamed Lahcen Zighidi. The creation of this commission was announced in August 2022 by Emmanuel Macron and his Algerian counterpart Abdelmadjid Tebboune, who recently told French publication L’Opinion: “To depoliticise this matter, I even met historian Benjamin Stora twice. He has my full respect and is carrying out serious work with his French and Algerian colleagues.”

But in recent months, Benjamin Stora has also come up against the French government’s growing indifference towards anti-colonial issues. Today, he watches with dismay as relations between Paris and Algiers deteriorate, driven by the divisive strategy pursued by France's interior minister Bruno Retailleau, tensions over the 1968 agreement between the two countries, the resurgence of reactionary voices, and the toxic obsession of media owned or influenced by the French billionaire businessman Vincent Bolloré. The historian here talks to Mediapart's Ellen Salvi.

Mediapart: How would you describe the crisis currently unfolding between Paris and Algiers?

Benjamin Stora: It's the most serious crisis since independence, given that Algeria has not had an ambassador in Paris for many months. That 's never happened before, not even at the height of previous tensions. Algeria has, of course, suspended diplomatic relations with France for a time in the past - after the attacks on Algerians in Marseille in 1973, for example - but never for this long.

Today, relations between Paris and Algiers are very strained. I wouldn't say they've been severed – because ties between countries with such a unique history can never be completely cut – but there's clearly paralysis on all levels, political and economic. The situation will inevitably evolve. It's subject to numerous factors, both in France – where there are still two years to go before the presidential election – and on the international stage.

The election of Donald Trump in the United States is a global upheaval that could lead to unexpected diplomatic adjustments, the full consequences of which are not yet clear. We're in a period of change. That change could be ultra-reactionary, but conversely, it could also transform into a kind of reaction against the reaction. For now, it's impossible to determine the outcome definitively.

Mediapart: In recent weeks, France's interior minister Bruno Retailleau has made increasingly virulent statements against Algeria. How do you see this turmoil?

B.S.: I was surprised by the extreme violence of the interior minister’s remarks. Such declarations normally used to come from the far-right in France. The Gaullist republican Right, on the other hand, did not engage in such confrontational rhetoric. Quite the opposite. Among historic Gaullists, many supported Algerian independence. From Jean-Marcel Jeanneney to Jacques Chirac, there was a tradition of rapprochement and good relations with Algiers.

I feel that the traditional Right has abandoned the Gaullist path. This shift did not happen overnight; it began with Nicolas Sarkozy, who took over the UMP [rightwing political party] in 2004 with a stance that discarded Gaullist principles. The change took place then, and it has naturally continued right down to Bruno Retailleau. Perhaps we didn't fully grasp the significance of this realignment of the Right towards the far-right.

Mediapart: Following Bruno Retailleau’s lead, prime minister François Bayrou has himself now decided to raise the stakes on this issue…

B.S.: This is even more surprising because François Bayrou belongs to the historic Christian democratic tradition, which had never previously aligned itself with classic far-right positions. Yet in recent times, we have indeed witnessed a – very rapid – shift towards the hard-line stance favoured by the far-right.

Has François Bayrou done this for domestic political manoeuvring? Because he needs the far-right, because wants to remain prime minister, or is in a difficult position? There are petty-minded political calculations going on that don't match the stakes involved. We are, after all, talking about a very significant period in the relationship between France, and Europe, and the South.

Mediapart: Emmanuel Macron then spoke out in an attempt to temper the remarks made by Bruno Retailleau and François Bayrou. But how do you explain the fact that he allowed them to continue until now, at the risk of worsening the crisis?

B.S.: Honestly, I don’t know. I'm not privy to discussions at the highest levels of state. Moreover, I haven't seen Emmanuel Macron for several months and haven't been able to discuss the matter with him. I simply spoke with his adviser on the Maghreb [editor's note, North Africa] and the Middle East in an attempt to understand France’s position on Western Sahara [editor's note, a disputed territory which is a source of tension between Morocco and Algeria].

It was following the president’s statements - when, in the summer of 2024, Emmanuel Macron aligned himself with Morocco’s autonomy plan for the future of Western Sahara - that the other issues emerged. The OQTF orders [editor's note, an official order for an individual to leave French territory], the migration question... all of this stems from France’s position on Western Sahara.

Mediapart: How did you view this shift?

Until now, France had maintained a balanced position on the issue of Western Sahara, considering all possibilities, including that of self-determination. Emmanuel Macron has chosen to adopt a single perspective - that of Western Sahara under Moroccan sovereignty. I don't know why we moved from an open position to a fixed stance.

For me, the fundamental issue is the unity of the Maghreb. The entire history of the nationalist movement in the Maghreb, from the Étoile Nord-Africaine [editor's note, the 'North African Star' was an Algerian nationalist organisation] in 1926 to the 1958 Tangier Conference between the major nationalist parties - the Algerian FLN, Morocco’s Istiqlal, and Tunisia’s Neo-Destour - was built on this unity. But it has been abandoned in favour of narrow nationalisms. After independence, each country withdrew into its own nation at the expense of building a unified Maghreb region.

Yet, the interconnectedness of the Maghreb exists when it comes to its people - through language, culture, religion, food… But this history has been obstructed by nationalist dynamics exploited by those in power, as well as by foreign influences. I would have preferred for France, as a former colonial power, to have encouraged dialogue between these countries.

Mediapart: Many political figures - starting with François Bayrou and Bruno Retailleau - want to challenge the 1968 agreement with Algeria. How do you interpret this focus on the accord?

B.S.: Contrary to what's thought, the 1968 agreement was a restrictive measure aimed at regulating migration flows that had been in place since 1962. The Évian Accords [editor's note, the agreements which ended the Algerian war of independence] had, in fact, allowed for free movement between the two countries so that those born in Algeria - who were French nationals - could travel freely between both shores after independence.

At the time, hundreds of thousands of pieds-noirs [editor's note, Algerians of French descent] migrated to France. The scale of these movements meant that free circulation was no longer feasible, so the French government decided to regulate them. It was in this context that compensations were granted to Algerian workers, who had also crossed the Mediterranean.

Later, other agreements were signed, notably in 1994, to amend these advantages. So I don't think the 1968 agreement is the real issue here. I have the impression that, more than anything, the challenge to the 1968 agreement hides a lingering resentment towards Algeria - as if France should not be granting so-called “privileges” to a country it was forced to leave.

Mediapart: But beyond this obsession, what does François Bayrou mean when he accuses Algiers of “failing to respect” its international commitments?

B.S.: Honestly, I don't know, because Algeria has signed all international agreements. However, on the issue of OQTF deportation orders [editor's note, orders issued by France], Algiers is obliged to take back its nationals when they have committed crimes and offences abroad. That's the case with the Mulhouse attack [editor's note,which took place in that north-east French city on February 22nd]. That much is true. But what troubles me is the way all relations with Algeria are being questioned solely on this issue of OQTF.

Mediapart: There's also the case of the writer Boualem Sansal, who remains imprisoned in Algeria. Would his release help bring about an end to the crisis?

B.S.: His release would be a significant gesture, allowing for much calmer and more balanced exchanges between France and Algeria. Especially since figures such as Bruno Retailleau see it as a prerequisite for any further discussion. At that point, it becomes a trial of strength. But states don't like to negotiate under pressure.

I've already talked about my differences with Boualem Sansal, particularly when he made the completely surreal claim that western Algeria belonged to Morocco. These differences go back a long way, but they're part of political history debates, and such debates can't take place if someone's in prison. So of course he should be freed.

At the same time, I can't help but think of the Algerian journalists who were arrested before Boualem Sansal. Notably, Ihsane El Kadi, the founder of [business news website] Maghreb Émergent, who spent several months in prison. The campaign for his release barely resonated in France - there were no large gatherings with writers, journalists or intellectuals calling for him to be freed, for example.

Mediapart: What do these tensions between the two countries reveal about the current political climate in France?

B.S.: They reveal a major reactionary backlash regarding French history, just when we thought significant progress had been made in acknowledging the colonial past. When I began working on Algeria in 1974, compiling the biography of Messali Hadj [editor's note, a key figure in Algerian nationalism], we were a long way behind when it came to recognising the colonial era’s brutalisation and domination of societies. I had described this denial in my book La Gangrène et l’oubli [editor's note, published by La Découverte in 1991].

But from the 2000s onwards, a new generation of researchers – many of them women – took up the subject: Sylvie Thénault, Raphaëlle Branche, Tramor Quemeneur, Marie Chominot, Malika Rahal, Linda Amiri, Naïma Huber-Yahi… There was a general movement towards knowledge and acknowledgement of this history.

Yet today, I feel that all this accumulated knowledge has not permeated French society. The political parties have not embraced the colonial question. Anti-colonialism is a political legacy of the decolonisations of the 1960s, but it has not been fully acknowledged as such. This has allowed some to easily roll back progress on the issue.

Mediapart: You produced a report that led to several gestures of recognition – such as acknowledging the murders of Maurice Audin and Ali Boumendjel, for example. What took place between that work and the current crisis?

B.S.: I was supported at the start, that’s undeniable. A number of recommendations were carried out by the President of the Republic, without explicit support from either the Left or the Right. After the measures on Ali Boumendjel, I thought they'd ask: “What do we do next?” How can we progress on nuclear tests? On further opening up the archives? I got no response.

I must say, this silence made me question whether these parties consider these issues as minor. That's a mistake, because these questions affect all the new generations from postcolonial migrations. They're as fundamental as any other subjects we constantly deal with.

Emmanuel Macron initially took steps in this area, but then he seemed to pull back. Was it because of the war in Ukraine? Or did he approach the subject as an episode that had to be orchestrated before moving on to something else? But anti-colonialism is not some peripheral issue that can be opened and closed in an instant. It's a structural issue, a deep definition of what France's history was.

The Algerians then proposed a mixed commission of French and Algerian historians to work together on colonial history. Not to write a shared history, but to share knowledge and advance understanding. We met five times, in Algeria and in France, between 2023 and 2024. The work began with an assessment of the sources on the massacres committed during the colonial incursion of the 19th century. And then, after Emmanuel Macron’s statement on the Sahara, everything stopped.

Mediapart: At the time your report was presented, the Élysée was particularly insistent on avoiding any form of “repentance” or “apologies”…

B.S.: I heard all that, but I was already telling them not to get involved in those debates. The Algerians don't want repentance or apologies; they want recognition of the massacres, they want concrete actions, such as France taking responsibility for cleaning up the waste left by nuclear tests in the Sahara.

I’ll give you another example: in the mixed commission, the Algerian historians requested the return of Emir Abdelkader’s personal Qur’an, his baton of command, and his burnous [traditional cloak]. Three items that had disappeared, presumably stolen.

Nothing has been returned. I was told that in France a law on restitution first had to be passed. Today, in 2025, what's been given back to Algeria? Nothing. Not even a… burnous. Nor Emir Abdelkader's baton of command which is displayed in a museum in Aix-en-Provence. And we continue to endlessly talk about “repentance”...

Mediapart: We have discussed the political climate in France. What about the political climate in Algeria?
The government in Algeria was threatened from 2019 onwards by the Hirak, a massive democratic movement interrupted by Covid… From then on, the political field has gradually closed down. It’s a shame because one of the major demands of the youth involved in this movement was the re-appropriation of Algeria’s history, which had long been confiscated by the single-party state.

Unfortunately, this movement has not resumed, and the Franco-Algerian crisis is partly to blame.  There's a resurgence of nationalism in Algeria, and people feel hurt over their national identity. On [French news channel] CNews or other news channels…, whenever a serious event occurs, it’s always Algeria’s fault. All of this crosses the Mediterranean. Algerians may not necessarily agree with their government, but they don't want to feel humiliated by France.

Mediapart: You’ve often said that the younger generation was one of the keys to reconciling memories of the past. Is the Franco-Algerian crisis undermining this hope?
B.S.: I don’t think so, because I feel that the youth from postcolonial migrations want to irreversibly reclaim their history. They want to know, they want to understand. And an editorial in [French publication] Le Figaro magazine or an article from Le Journal du Dimanche [editor's note, a French Sunday newspaper] isn't going to stop them. It’s a movement that won’t be halted, even though it's hindered by a very virulent French nationalism, which doesn’t accept its withdrawal as the end of empire and seeks to de-legitimise anti-colonialism.

The reaction could, of course, prevail, as we see in the United States, which is terrible. But the movement acknowledging colonial history and slavery is too powerful today. When we see the number of people working on the colonial question in France… You certainly don’t find many researchers glorifying French Algeria or the colonial era. When you compare the number of academic productions, knowledge, conferences or seminars, it’s a completely different picture.

I base my optimism on the strength of the knowledge accumulated by the younger generations in universities, both in France and abroad. I’m not talking about “wokeness,” I don’t know what that means. But anti-colonialism – that is, recognition of the other, of the history of the other, of the history of others – is a committed movement. We want to know the history of others in order to understand our own history. It’s a deep-rooted movement. It will be very difficult for reactionary movements to oppose it.

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• The original French version of this interview can be found here.

English version by Michael Streeter