On Tuesday, the 50th anniversary of the Elysée Treaty that normalized relations between Germany and France after World War II, will be celebrated with great pomp and circumstance in Berlin, reports Spiegel online.
The treaty was signed on Jan. 22, 1963, by then-German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer and General Charles de Gaulle. The German-French friendship treaty laid the cornerstone for rapprochement after the war as well as the foundations for European unification.
Veteran French politician Jacques Delors and former German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer discuss tight, but sometimes complicated, relations between their countries on the 50th anniversary of the Franco-German friendship treaty in this interview with Der Spiegel.
The anniversary comes at a time when the two countries are drifting apart economically, the relationship is being tested politically as a result of the euro crisis, and assurances of friendship seem hollow at times.
In an interview, two politicians whose familiarity with the relationship between the two countries stems from years of observation, discuss the treaty's significance: Jacques Delors, 87, who as head of the European Commission from 1985 to 1995, presided over the critical preliminary work to establish the economic and monetary union; and Joschka Fischer, 64, who advocated a "United States of Europe" while serving as Germany's foreign minister between 1998 and 2005.
SPIEGEL:Mr. Delors, did the signing of the Elysée Treaty feel like an historic event to you at the time?
Delors: The public embrace between Charles de Gaulle and Konrad Adenauer represented an unusual, even unparalleled, outbreak of emotion in the interaction between two countries. My father was 90 percent disabled when he returned from World War I. The reconciliation with Germany corresponded to his deeply felt desire that it should never happen again. For me, the emotional dimension of the Elysée Treaty is part of that. But this process began much earlier. I think one of the first significant moments was the appeal by then-French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman on May 9, 1950. It led to the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community and laid the foundation for the eventual development of the European Union.
SPIEGEL: Mr. Fischer, what did German-French reconciliation mean to you?
Fischer: The emotions are still very fresh in my mind. De Gaulle's visit to Germany, his speech in (the southwestern city of) Ludwigsburg, the service he attended in Reims with Adenauer, the brotherly kiss at the Elysée Palace, all of this triggered a rousing sense of enthusiasm. I was a schoolboy in short pants at the time, and yet I still perceived it as an immensely hopeful encounter. When I later traveled to France for the first time, I was entering a different world, and it was a revelation -- not just politically, but also gastronomically. It was an experience that made a strong impression on my generation.
SPIEGEL: So for German youth, France became a place of longing, a place onto which they could project their unfulfilled dreams?
Fischer: Eating lamb chops with green beans in a French bistro, it changed the way you felt about life. Today everyday life has become very similar in many European countries, but in those days it was still an encounter between completely different cultures.
SPIEGEL: Nevertheless, the Elysée Treaty remained unfulfilled in many ways.
Delors: The symbolic significance is far more important than the concrete implementation. The regular meetings among the French president, the German chancellor, the (government) ministers and the officials, as stipulated under the treaty, are invaluable. It means that both sides to talk to each other, even in difficult times. The Elysée Treaty was also very successful in the area of youth and culture. Nevertheless, there is room for debate over whether we've really made a lot of progress in foreign and defense policy.
SPIEGEL: Doesn't the crisis in Mali demonstrate that there is actually no common policy?
Fischer: That's not a matter of the Elysée Treaty, but one of the German government. What exactly is our foreign policy? We should support France. It doesn't necessarily have to come in the form of combat troops, even though I don't know how things will develop. But we ought to provide more intensive assistance than two transport aircraft. You can't say that al-Qaida establishing a foothold in Mali constitutes a threat to Europe and then leave the work to others. (The notion of a) common foreign and defense policy apparently doesn't exist in the minds of key members of the German government.
Delors: I understand the difficult position the German government finds itself in, for historic reasons. But I would like to experience true cooperation in foreign and defense policy at least once in my lifetime.
SPIEGEL: Is this a breakdown once again? Is the talk of steadfast friendship just a whitewash, covering up the cracks and preventing both countries from openly discussing and addressing their differences?
Fischer: We have become a family, and no one fights more than siblings. I've seen the sparks fly a few times between (former French President) Jacques Chirac and (former German Chancellor) Gerhard Schröder. But they had to deal with each other, because breaking up the relationship is simply unthinkable.
Delors: Or else the family won't survive.
SPIEGEL: Does this still apply during such an existential test as the euro crisis?
Fischer: I am convinced that the relationship between France and Germany is currently being portrayed in public as much more tense than it actually is. A hesitation, a pause and a divergence comes with every change of government. It's part of democratic change. But it's still true today that there can be no progress within the European Union without Franco-German cooperation, because both sides are powerful enough to block progress. If there is a point to the celebrations surrounding the 50th anniversary of the Elysée Treaty, it is to confront both countries with their responsibility. Friendship without responsibility is worthless.
Delors: That's why the Elysée Treaty must also remain a sort of shrine of memory. You can't analyze the presence without knowing the past and learning lessons from it. Europe threatens to lose influence in the new global balance of power, and when that happens its prosperity also suffers. I have been anxious about the decline of Europe for a long time, especially when I think about Europe's weak decision-making abilities and the challenges it faces in the world.
SPIEGEL: Do you believe that (French President) François Hollande and (German Chancellor) Angela Merkel are up to the challenge?
Delors: It's too early to make an assessment. Besides, I'm not sitting under the table when the two of them meet. But there is a disconcerting tendency to blame each other for problems. The French must understand that they can only modernize their economy under their own steam. The Germans won't do it for them. Conversely, it doesn't help when the Germans arrogantly or reproachfully look down on France's weaknesses.
Fischer: Just look at how far Ms. Merkel has moved since the financial and monetary crisis erupted. How many red lines has she crossed that she had once drawn? And how far has (former French President) Nicolas Sarkozy gone to accommodate her, so much so that he was voted out of office because he was perceived as being Merkel's lapdog? Bailout, transfer union, rescue fund, economic administration -- terms that were once taboo for the Germans and are no longer an issue today! We've made progress on integration in recent years that I wouldn't have thought possible. National crisis management doesn't lead us to our goals. All attempts to achieve German hegemony are doomed to fail, and we aren't doing ourselves any favours by pursuing them.
Read more of this interview with Spiegel Online.