Plus ça change…the stark reality of Mali's bright new future

ItIt is autumn 2014 and Bamako is, as it was before, an African capital fallen into a torpor. The war? Terrorism? Tuareg separatists? It all seems far away, somewhere up there, in the distant north of Mali. Almost another country. And those promises of change after groups of jihadists seized part of the country in 2012 and after French troops intervened to remove them in 2013? What has remained of the “No going back!” chanted by Mali's political classes and their declared wish to rebuild a country that was more responsible, less corrupt and which listened to what its people wanted?
A year-and-a-half ago Mediapart published a series of articles about Mali's quest to reconstruct itself (see here and here). The unanimous feeling of local elites and their international partners was that, behind an appealing façade, the country had collapsed, rather like a building in which all that remains are its four walls. All seemed to agree that the institutions had to be reformed from top to bottom, that new leaders were needed and that trust had to rebuilt with the people. Everyone that Mediapart spoke to at the time – intellectuals, politicians, diplomats and civic society activists – made the same points and seemed optimistic that the crisis of 2012-2013 had served as a wake-up call to the nation. Even if no one used the expression word for word, everyone seemed to take on board the phrase used by Barack Obama's advisor and current mayor of Chicago Rahm Emanuel: “You never want a serious crisis to go to waste. And what I mean by that is an opportunity to do things you think you could not do before.”

Eighteen months on, Mediapart went back to Bamako to evaluate the political situation in Mali and find out if things had changed – and if so, for the better. The best brief summary came from a Malian advisor to a large Western embassy who quipped ironically: “It's changing in the way it stays the same!” In other words - and just about everyone in Mali agrees on this point - things have not really changed despite the election of a new president, despite the heavy presence on the ground of the international community and despite France's interest in capitalising on a Malian “success story”.
So what has caused those hopes of renewal to be dashed so quickly, and what does that say, too, about President François Hollande's interventionist foreign policy?

The Malian crisis of 2012-13 had many different causes, both local and further afield, but what is clear is that it led to the collapse of a regime headed by president Amadou Toumani Touré (ATT) which everyone had thought was quite stable. In March 2012, just before presidential elections for which ATT had decided he would not stand, he was ousted by a coup led by army caption Amadou Sanogo, while rebels seized the north of the country. Following France's intervention in January 2013 it was decided to hold new presidential elections as quickly as possible, given that the 2012 elections had been scrapped because of the coup. This decision was taken by François Hollande and, despite the many warnings from those who pleaded they should be postponed as the country needed time to allow new political figures and political habits to emerge, the elections duly went ahead in August 2013. They led to the anticipated outcome: mediocrity.

“In the kingdom of the blind, the one-eyed man is king.” That was how one Malian academic greeted the election of Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta (IBK) in 2013. IBK was a political veteran caught between two different positions: on the one hand he was an old hand of the Malian political system (he had been prime minister in the 1990s), and on the other he was a staunch opponent of the man ousted in 2012, ATT. In this emergency situation he proved to be a suitable candidate, both with his fellow citizens, who believed in his tough message, and the great powers, including France whom he had courted.
Two other background factors to IBK's election success need to be considered. One is that, as political expert Mahamadou Diawara stresses, “doing politics in Mali costs money. And only the old generation, those from the time of the arrival of democracy in 1991, have the means because they've been in power for two decades”. The second point is that IBK is a former president of Socialist International who for years cultivated links with the French Socialist Party, in particular coming to visit the Fondation Jean Jaurès, an important institution in the world of French socialism. His last visit was in the month before the presidential election in Mali.

'IBK is in a fragile position and there are some decisions he can't take'

So Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta was elected president and his investiture was attended by 26 heads of state, including of course François Hollande. “Everyone was quick to forget that he belonged to the 'shameful' group of those who made a show of condemning the 2012 coup while getting involved with Sanogo's junta,” recalls the opposition figure Tiébilé Dramé. He himself was initially a candidate for the first round of the 2013 election before withdrawing from the race, considering that it was not the right moment to hold elections. “People forgot [IBK's] failures and the fact that he was about luxury and money,” Dramé adds.
It did not take long for two scandals to break, scandals which revived memories of all the old damaging practices that Malians seemed to want to forget. The first involved several contracts awarded by the ministry of defence which were overbilled to the tune of 30 billion CFA francs, about 45 million euros. The second related to the purchase of a new presidential aircraft, a Boeing 737, for 30 million euros, with part of the cost constituting commission to a man called Michel Tomi. Tomi, described by some as a Corsican-Gabonese “gangster”, is the incarnation of Françafrique – a term encapsulating France's neocolonial approach to African countries and involving close business ties and and personal links with leaders on the continent – possesses the only casino licence in Bamako, and is a great friend of IBK.

The only positive aspect of these two scandals is that they were revealed by an irate International Monetary Fund and led to the temporary suspension of IMF and World Bank loans and a demand for explanations. “The IMF is playing the role of the opposition, even that of civic society in holding the government accountable,” says the anthropologist Birama Diakon. Such events underline both the weakness of the Malian elites and the fact that the country is under the supervision of the international community.
“People thought that 'IBK' was a strongman,” says Birama Diakon. “In fact he's in a fragile position and there are some decisions he can't take. It's extremely difficult to escape corruption in Mali. The pressure from clientelist networks is so strong that you're under permanent pressure, whether it's getting one's son treated at the hospital or being awarded a promotion.”
During his election campaign IBK's slogan was “Mali first”. For his critics the president’s approach is now “the family first”. Not only has he appointed relatives to top official posts, but the minister of defence, who resigned following the allegations of overbilling, was close to him, as is Michel Tomi.

In the congested streets of Bamako, a currency dealer gives his verdict on the IBK administration so far: “The government is eating our money!” Like many Malians he had lent cautious support to Captain Sanogo's 2012 coup, because it had changed things, something which seemed a good thing to this generation of young students and unemployed youths who had not experienced the coups of the past. However, he quickly changed his mind when his brother, a soldier, told him about the reality of Sanogo in government, who was simply the latest incarnation of an opportunist leader wanting to profiteer from the state, or what remained of it.

For more than 20 years the same generation, those who had gone out onto the streets in 1991 to remove the dictator Moussa Traoré, has monopolised power and its money. IBK is part of that generation and, to a certain extent, he is perpetuating the state of decline that puts a distance between the Malians and their government; the government which “eats our money”.
However, according to Moumouni Soumano, the director of the Malian centre for inter-party dialogue and democracy (Centre malien pour le dialogue inter-partis et la démocratie or CMDID), “IBK holds all the cards to be able change things. It's one of the first times that a corruption scandal has caused such a furore, and he has committed himself on the issue of corruption like none of his predecessors have done. There's obviously a paradox here, for these big scandals have arisen even though the prime minister comes from a new generation.” In fact that is one of the positive aspects of IBK's presidency, that he has been able to promote young politicians, including the prime minister Moussa Mara, who have made “good governance” their main political issue. For example, when he was the mayor of a district of Bamako Mara published a declaration of financial interests. “He's trying to be transparent,” says Moumouni Soumano, approvingly.

'It's not Mali that's waging war - France and the UN are in charge of it'

Among those members of the government who are trying to forge another Mali, there is also Ousmane Sy, the minister for decentralisation and towns and a development specialist who has worked outside the country. In his view “we're not experiencing a national crisis as, despite their differences, all Malians want to continue to live together. We’re experiencing a crisis of the state. We must ensure the state isn't something we fight against every day. In the view of Malians, taking money from the state and giving it to your community or to your family is not seen as corruption, it's even a matter of prestige! That's what needs to be reformed.”

Ousmane Sy is one of the government members who regularly goes to Algeria to conduct negotiations with the rebel armies in the north of Mali. These talks are regarded as crucial to bringing about lasting peace in the whole of Mali but at the moment they seem to be floundering. Contrary to what was decided during the signing of an earlier agreement in Ouagadougou in June 2013 between the Malian government and armed Tuareg groups, these militias have not been confined to quarters. The result is that they now constitute an independent force in the north of the country that keeps its distance from the Malian state. That was shown in June 2014 when those forces attacked the prime minister’s delegation during a visit to the northern town of Kidal. This sends the message to many Malians that Bamako does not control all of its territory.

Ousmane Sy is himself optimistic about the outcome of these talks. “When we're around the table we're all Malians,” he says. “These are people facing each other who have worked side by side and who are sometimes from the same family or the same tribe. The process could well be long, but it will get there.” Others are more sceptical. “It's a political game detached from reality,” says French academic Charles Grémont, a specialist on the Sahel region. “There's a gap between what people experience on the ground, where they live in virtual autonomy, and the talks which craft lofty words which no one takes in the same way: autonomy, federalism, decentralisation...” But as everyone has an interest in completing an agreement – and especially France – there is likely to be one, probably in the first quarter of 2015.
Charles Grémont warns, however, that there is an important and unknown factor overshadowing the talks. “That's the question of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and other jihadist movements who continue to occupy the area,” he says. Even if representatives of these groups are at the talks in Algiers, it is hard to see them laying down their arms in the current context. “Mali is not an island. The crisis has taken root here but it is a crisis that goes wider,” points out Ousmane Sy. It is a simple truth that now weighs heavily on the country.
If, like dozens of other countries, Mali has always been supported by financial and technical aid from abroad, it is hard not to view the country today as being under the effective control of international powers. As already mentioned, the IMF and the World Bank play the joint role of financiers and spending watchdogs. The United Nations, which has taken over the luxury hotel in the capital's centre, looks after security, humanitarian aid and “support for national dialogue” in the country in a mission known as the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali or MINUSMA for short. The European Union, meanwhile, is training the Malian army under the EU Training Mission in Mali (EUTM Mali). As for the French, they are less involved now after the intervention mission, Operation Serval, was transformed into Operation Barkhane on August 1st, 2014, which has a wider anti-terrorist remit across the Sahel. But French troops are in de facto control of the borders and the fight against jihadists in the north of Mali.

“Mali isn't waging war, it's France and the [UN mission] MINUSMA who are in charge of it,” says political expert Mahamadou Diawara with dismay. “Moreover, MINUSMA interposes itself between the rebel groups in the north and the Malian army. There's a total blackout about the town of Kidal: the rest of Mali has absolutely no news of what goes on there.” In such circumstances it is hard for the Malian population not to feel a sense of resentment about the international community. It is hard, also, to see how this presence can be scaled down in the near future, especially given the tough comments by the UN's under-secretary-general for peacekeeping operations, former French diplomat Hervé Ladsous, during a visit to Bamako in October 2014 after the death of nine Nigeria UN peacekeepers. “We are in a situation where we are [no longer] in a peacekeeping environment and this behoves on us to take a number of measures to face these asymmetric threats,” he said. In earlier comments in September 2014 Ladsous had also noted: “I believe it's indisputable that terrorists and jihadists and probably also traffickers have regained strength [in northern Mali].”

This kind of analysis contradicts the public stance adopted by France, in particular the comments of President Hollande and defence minister Jean-Yves Le Drian, who in early 2013 imprudently suggested that France's intervention would be a short one. Even today a close advisor to Hollande insists: “I have a lot of regard for Hervé Ladsous, but I think he's wrong.” Indeed, Paris does not want to hear any suggestion that Mali is a failed state that will have to be propped up for years, such as Afghanistan, Iraq or Somalia, even if it is the UN and other international institutions who will take control of this.

'Elections don't bring about democracy or stability'

“It's obvious that France wants to withdraw as quickly as possible and intends to do it in the best circumstances. It wants a 'success story',” says opposition politician Tiébilé Dramé. A European diplomat in Bamako agrees: “That's why it wanted quick elections, even if it meant supporting a candidate with no ideas, why it wants a political agreement with the rebel groups in the framework of the Algiers talks, and why Operation Barkhane has taken on a regional dimension, leaving the [UN mission] MINUSMA to grapple with security in the country.” The Malian journalist Souleymane Drabo, who runs the pro-government newspaper L'Essor, also highlights the reasoning behind Paris's approach. “To stay too long means taking hits. Barkhane's strategy is regional and France is not dealing with domestic problems.”
But can France pull out as easily as that? Since François Hollande came to power in May 2012 he has launched two French military operations (Mali and the Central African Republic), the country has taken part in another, exclusively aerial, operation against Islamic State in Iraq and he was prepared for another that did not take place when Barack Obama pulled back at the last minute from intervening in Syria. That is a lot of operations in a short period of time. And while the military operations themselves have been well-executed and fulfilled their objectives, the political side of the equation in these operations has been almost totally absent.

“Elections don't bring about democracy or stability.” That is a maxim that the United States learnt the hard way on the ground under George W. Bush. At the time the US thought that they could simply intervene, organise elections, support a moderate candidate, hand out a little aid, get the UN involved and then leave after a few months, rubbing their hands in satisfaction at the thought of having done their job. That was not how it turned out. Iraq is today a fractured country which has given birth to the spectre of a new terrorist force. As for Afghanistan, no one can seriously imagine that the country is going to remain stable for long, unless there is an agreement with the ancient foe, the Taliban.
Mali today is not yet in that situation. But how can one reconcile the French government’s view that “it's all going well, there's no need to worry, Mali's moving in the right direction” with, on the one hand, the deaths of MINUSMA peacekeeping troops (43 so far) and the increase in Operation Barkhane's operation – it currently has 3,000 soldiers but the non-commissioned officers are calling for more – and, on the other, the inertia of Mali's elites?
“France is like the rest of the international community: it needs stability to focus on its agenda, which is the fight against terrorism and against drugs trafficking,” says a Malian advisor at a Western embassy in Bamako. “But in the minds of the Western leaders stability simply means less violence and communities staying calm, so they can get out quickly. That's totally at odds with a policy of long-term peace.”

Anxious not to be viewed as a modern exponent of the colonialism seen during France's Third and Fourth republics, nor as pursuing the 'Françafrique' policies carried out in particular under presidents Charles de Gaulle and François Mitterrand, President Hollande prefers to believe that France has carried out its mission in Mali and can now withdraw. 'State building' clearly remains a banned expression in the French political arena. But the laissez-faire approach is just as devastating. To suggest that a military intervention followed by a quick election can put a country back on its feet is a dangerous illusion.

Almost two years after France launched Operation Serval the underlying situation in Mali (in other words, the north-south divide, the indifference of its elites and the incompetence of its armed forces) has not changed. The country is now under multinational control and has had some of its sovereign functions taken away (for example, controlling its own frontiers) but this foreign interference seems less concerned with the interests of Malians than with its own interests. To suggest the opposite amounts to a travesty of reality.
“The mediocre governed us for ten years. Today it's the bandits who are promoting the mediocre. We're going to struggle to get out of it...” says Houmou Traoré, a restaurant owner who bases her own business on the quality of her produce. Though one should always be wary of the popular wisdom that you come across in traditional African restaurants (known as 'maquis'), she nonetheless reveals the state of mind of a Malian population who are tired of feeling pushed around and of having such little control over their destiny.

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• The French version of this article can be found here.

English version by Michael Streeter