If it is not yet a full rift, it is getting close to one. On Monday January 31st the ruling junta in Mali gave the French ambassador Joël Meyer, 72 hours to “leave the country”. This was a radical and extremely rare act in a part of Africa that the former colonial power France still considers to be its home turf. The authorities in the Malian capital Bamako said the move followed the “hostile and outrageous comments” made by France's foreign minister Jean-Yves Le Drian.
In recent days the French foreign minister has certainly been coming out with ever-more forthright and distinctly undiplomatic declarations aimed at the military-civilian administration that governs in Bamako after two successive coups d'État, the first in August 2020, the second in May 2021. Many citizens in Mali regard these attacks as vitriolic and even paternalistic.
On RTL radio on January 28th, Le Drian spoke of the junta in Mali as “illegitimate”, attacked the “unacceptable seizure” of power by the soldiers and criticised its “irresponsible measures”. Just the day before Denmark had been forced to announce it was withdrawing its hundred or so troops who had just been deployed to Mali as part of the European Takuba task force. This force is under French command and over time it is due to take over from the existing French-run anti-insurgency operation Barkhane. The Danish move was in response to a demand from Mali's government which had not at that point given its consent to the deployment.
Two days later, on January 30th, in an interview with the the Journal du Dimanche (JDD) Sunday newspaper, the French foreign minister again spoke of the Bamako government's “illegitimacy” and referred to a “breakdown in the military framework”. He concluded: “The situation can't stay as it is.” Finally, on February 1st, as his ambassador Joël Meyer was packing his bags, Jean-Yves Le Drian brought the issue up again before French Members of Parliament. “What is this junta that wants to stay in power another five years having spent two years in power after two successive coups d'État, and which has just handed out constitutional lessons? … One thing is for sure, we're not going to interrupt our fight against terrorism,” he told the MPs.
The authorities in Bamako saw this last declaration as a final insult. “This condescension is unacceptable,” said one diplomat close to the joint military-civilian regime, who asked to remain anonymous. “France is showing its true face here. It believes that Mali is still its home territory, as in colonial times.”
Supporters of the junta point that the French minister has been very conciliatory towards certain military regimes that have broken with the constitutional rules in recent years but which have not broken off relations with France. They point in particular to Chad, where Paris quickly accepted the coup d'État by Mahamat Idriss Déby in April 2021, and also to Egypt, where Le Drian seems to have no issues dealing with the dictator Marshal Abdel Fattah el-Sisi.
These “double standards” also cause some irritation within the corridors of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs itself, where some diplomats view Le Drian's comments as counter-productive. “We're in a dangerous escalation and rather than calming things down the minister is constantly throwing fuel on the fire,” said one senior official at the ministry who also asked to stay anonymous.
Interviewed during a trip to Brussels on the B2 website on January 31st, Mali's foreign minister Abdoulaye Diop responded to Le Drian and to France's defence minister Florence Parly who has also stepped up criticism of the junta. He did not hold back either. “We do indeed get the feeling of a certain disdain. They're not listening to us,” Diop told the website. “A friend can always give us advice. They're welcome to do so. But not in this cavalier fashion. Who is Mr Le Drian to decide on the legitimacy of the regime? Mali is not a province of France. People need to move on from this kind of paternalism and condescension.” Abdoulaye Diop continued: “It's for Malians to decide … we want to have an independent, effective defence system that's capable of responding to the security challenges of the Malian people. And if cooperation is not part of this framework, well yes, I'm sorry, we're going to have to say: 'Thanks very much. But your help is not required!'”
The tension between the two countries has been rising for months. France – which had intervened militarily in 2013 to stop Islamist rebels taking control - had become irritated by the inability of the subsequent government under President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta to extricate the country from the mess it was in, and had discreetly welcomed the coup by soldiers in August 2020, though without saying so officially. But the second coup, in May 2021, changed things.
Pro-French pair leave power
Colonel Assimi Goïta, the leader of the 2021 putsch, quickly got rid of Paris's two main contacts in the government, both of them civilians; the president of the transition, Bah N'Daw, and transition prime minister Moctar Ouane. To justify this latest resort to arms, those close to Colonel Goïta put forward several reasons designed to curry favour with public opinion. These reasons included the civilian pair's supposed refusal to fight against corruption and in particular to pursue leaders from the former regime; their opposition to the cooperation with Russia wanted by some involved in the first coup, a number of whom have ties to Moscow; and, finally, the pair's closeness to Paris. Weary of war, more and more Malians are critical of France's influence which they see as harmful. Some even fear the former colonial power has a hold over Mali's leaders.
Two other episodes, which took place around the same time as the pro-French pair were removed, also contributed to the tension between the two countries. On June 7th 2021 the junta appointed politician Choguel Kokalla Maïga as the new prime minister for the transition. According to someone close to him Maïga, who was educated in Russia, has a “deep-rooted mistrust” of France. He has also made it clear he intends to give the people what they want. Given his current lack of electoral support his view is that this the only way he can hold on to his position.
Then, on June 10th, three days after Maïga's appointment, President Emmanuel Macron announced in Paris the “end of Operation Barkhane as an external operation”. The problem was that, according to the Malian authorities, the French president had not told them about this in advance.
“President Goïta and the government learnt about it from the television. I don't think that's the best way to work together. In Mali we really had the feeling that it was a punishment for our country, because of May's events,” said Abdoulaye Diop.
They haven't understood that the time when the French decide on our behalf is over.
Since then the tension has escalated. In September 2021, as rumours blew up that Russian mercenaries were to be used in Mali, prime minister Maïga accused France of having dropped Mali “in mid air”. He also recalled how in 2013 Paris had supported the Tuareg people who wanted independence from Mali. Some tough exchanges ensued between Paris and Bamako. On the issue of Mali using Russian mercenaries both Le Drian and Parly spoke of a “red line” that must not be crossed. “They thought that this would slow us down. They haven't understood that the time when the French decide on our behalf is over,” said the Malian diplomat cited earlier.
Then in December 2021 the junta discreetly called for a review of its defence framework agreement with France. The colonels behind the May 2021 coup said their country's sovereignty was at issue. Though officials did not put it like this, Paris saw this demand as an act of war. All operations involving the Barkhane and Takuba forces depend on a number of documents signed at the time by President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta.
“As a result of the legal structure of these agreements … the renegotiation of the terms and technical arrangements is today impossible without a new discussion on the legal basis of the intervention and the invitation on the Malian side … This discussion, even on some very technical points, will in the end lead the transition government to confirm or withdraw in clear terms its request for assistance,” wrote researcher Julien Antouly, who has studied the legal framework covering France's intervention in Mali, in a recent article in The Conversation.
Close to an outright breakdown
Then in January this year everything accelerated. As the first Russian mercenaries arrived in Mali, Bamako put more obstacles in the way of the international forces' operations. There were restrictions on flyovers by military aircraft, including those by the United Nations force in the country MINUSMA, and new demands concerning the deployment of European armies.
It is true that on the ground the cooperation between the Malian and French armies has continued and officially all is still going well. In reality, however, the new hurdles are causing issues. “We can no longer fly over certain zones. And some of our contacts say they can no longer do this or that with us,” said one senior French figure.
In fact, a complete breakdown of relations is not far away. Many experts and diplomats believe that the next stage in this escalation could be the last: an announcement of the withdrawal of the Takuba and Barkhane forces from Mali and of limited civilian co-operation with Bamako in the future. This would be similar to what happened in the Central African Republic after the arrival there of Russian mercenaries from the Wagner military group.
Paris, like other European capitals who are involved through the Takuba force, will give itself a fortnight to reach a decision. Off the record a senior French figure admits that the withdrawal of French troops is on the table and that it is even the most plausible course of action. “There are two types of discussion,” the source said. “The first is political: this concerns the length of the transition. It's ECOWAS [editor's note, the Economic Community of West African States or CÉDÉAO in French] who are taking the lead on that.”
In January the junta in Mali, which was supposed to be organising elections for next February, proposed staying in power for another five years. In response the heads of state from the ECOWAS countries imposed an economic blockade that went down very badly with the Malian people, and among West Africans more generally.
The second discussion, said the senior source in Paris, is over the military stakes involved, including the presumed presence of mercenaries from the Wagner group on the ground. Several sources – all of them French – state that there are now 600 Russian troops on Malian territory now, and that this number could rise to a thousand in the near future. Local sources in Mali report the presence of Russian soldiers alongside Malian troops, in particular in the regions of Mopti and Timbuktu. But no one is able to confirm whether they are instructors, as Bamako insists, or mercenaries as Paris believes.
French soldiers themselves are fairly clear about the situation: many of them, including at headquarters level, think that it is time to leave. On top of the actions taken by the junta in Bamako, which the French military consider to be “humiliations”, they think it would simply be unacceptable to be on the ground where Russian mercenaries are operating.
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- The original French version of this article can be found here.
English version by Michael Streeter