The French authorities have attempted to put a brave face on events in Mali since President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta – known as IBK – was forced to resign following a military coup on Tuesday August 18th. Indeed, France's reaction was among the most conciliatory of all the West African country's main partners and allies. It is true that Paris was swift in its condemnation of the coup. But whereas fellow members of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) took a tough line, calling for IBK to be both released and restored to the presidency, France adopted a more nuanced stance.
The day after the coup d'État France's foreign minister, Jean-Yves Le Drian, stated that he had “duly noted the announcement of the president's resignation”. He called for the “re-establishment of a civilian government” but did not call for IBK to be reinstated. It was the same tone from the Élysée. Emmanuel Macron tweeted : “The government in Mali must be handed back to civilians and the ground must be prepared for a return to constitutional order. President Keïta, his prime minister and the members of the government must be freed without delay and their security guaranteed.” Then in a statement on August 20th the president urged that “the government should be handed back as quickly as possible to civilians and that a rapid and democratic transition be guaranteed”. The lack of a demand for IBK to be reinstated did not go unnoticed in the Mali capital Bamako.
This was all it took to fuel the rumour that the coup d'État had been carried out with France's consent. “How could they not have known that a coup was being prepared, with all the surveillance methods at their disposal?” asked one West African entrepreneur who regularly travels between Mali and France.
Enlargement : Illustration 1
So having single-handedly supported IBK for several years, did the former colonial power in Mali decide to let him go? The idea of a coup plotted with France's backing seems unlikely. “We were surprised like everyone else,” said one French diplomat in Paris, who asked to remain anonymous. “We knew that the regime had been shaky for two months and that if IBK did nothing he risked falling, but we didn't think that the army would intervene. Not at this time, anyway.”
Several Malian sources also suggested that the civilian and military French authorities had no more link with the rebel soldiers than with many other Malian officers – who have practically all been trained in France during their career and who have fought alongside French soldiers in recent years against jihadist groups. “We know their background, they're brave soldiers, but it doesn't go any further than that,” said a source at the Élysée.
“This coup d'État isn't good news for us,” said another French diplomat who recently served in Bamako. “It's true IBK was no longer a man you could count on. But we need stability to carry out the fight against terrorism, and not a new period of uncertainty.”. Macron himself pointed on August 20th that France's priority in the region was “pursuing the fight against terrorism”. If France's leaders do not seem outraged by the coup in Mali this is because it did not come as a huge surprise. But that does not mean that they welcome it.
It is true that Macron and Le Drian were no longer relying on IBK to turn the country around. The president of Mali was elected in 2013 with the barely-disguised support of France and indeed a large section of the international community. He then went on to enjoy the unswerving support of the Élysée under the presidency of François Hollande, despite the number of scandals that have emerged since he took office, some of which involve people close to him.
But the situation changed when Emmanuel Macron was elected in 2017. “The president very quickly reached the conclusion that IBK was not reliable, that he had a share of responsibility in the state's decline, and that he would be incapable of putting a halt to his entourage's wheeler-dealing,” said the diplomat just quoted.
Instead, the French authorities decided to stake everything on the prime minister rather than a president with a reputation as a dilettante and for delegating much of his work to his staff. First of all it was Soumeylou Boubèye Maïga, a well-connected figure who was liked in Paris despite his unpopularity in Mali. He is credited as the person who enabled IBK to be re-elected in 2018 following a hotly-disputed election. Then, after his resignation in April 2019 following a series of demonstrations, it was the turn of Boubou Cissé to be prime minsiter.
Cissé was little known to the average Malian before being called into government in 2013 when he became first the minister for mines, then for the economy and finance. But this former executive at the World Bank was liked by the Élysée. He is a confirmed liberal who has built up a degree of trust with senior French officials and politicians. “He was highly thought of at the Élysée, as he was at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,” said one diplomat. But there was more to it than that. “He was seen as a rigorous and upright administrator,” said one international official. “He was reassuring for the international financial institutions and he kept the show on the road.” That at least is certainly what he led his French contacts to believe. “I'm the man you need. I'm the only one IBK listens to. Without me it would be a mess again,” he repeatedly told French diplomats, who were clearly won over. So Macron's entourage were counting on Cissé to hold the reins of power.
But the image that he enjoyed in Paris was far removed from the way he was seen back in Bamako. The French view of Cissé was that of a 'strong man' who had found a way of working with the president's family, in particular his son Karim Keïta, a Member of Parliament and said to have a great deal of influence in the country. “He had to deal with them to negotiate his own survival, because he knew their ability to cause trouble; it was they who were partly behind the departure of Boubèye Maïga. But he stood up to them. In particular he succeeded in keeping the minister of the economy and finance against the advice of the president's family, with the aim of putting a halt to the mess,” said a source at the Élysée.
The other view of Cissé, prevalent in Mali itself, was that he was a chancer with outsized political ambitions who was in cahoots with the president's family and who himself wanted to succeed IBK. “You had to be blind not to see Boubou Cissé's unpopularity,” said the entrepreneur previously cited. “Everyone here wanted his head, including the president's political allies, who didn't understand why he was so doggedly supported,” said a former minister.
'He kept telling the French that if he fell, it would open the gates to the Islamists'
France backed him for a reason. Several sources insist that Macron - and also the president of the Ivory Coast Alassane Ouattara – strongly supported Cissé to the end, even though the opposition in Mali wanted him to go. Before the coup the IBK regime had been wobbling for several weeks, under fire from the M5-RFP (Mouvement du 5 juin – Rassemblement des forces patriotiques) coalition. This diverse group is made up of political parties, groups from civil society, religious leaders and business people who criticised the regime's corruption and wanted IBK to quit. The president's personal position became weaker after a series of demonstrations – some of them violently repressed – involving thousands of Malians began on June 5th.
The coalition is led by Mahmoud Dicko, a local religious leader who favours dialogue with the jihadists. He does not mince his words when it comes to the former colonial power, accusing France of regularly interfering in Mali's internal affairs, and he is seen as a threat by Paris. Boubou Cissé understood this. “He kept telling the French that if he fell, it would open the gates to the Islamists,” said a man involved in the talks between the president and M5.
Duringboth those talks, which were held behind closed doors, and in the one-to-one night time meetings between IBK and Dicko, the latter's demands changed. Though some of the youths who took part in the street demonstrations each week were still calling for the president to go, M5's leaders were themselves divided. Dicko himself was no longer calling for this.
By mid-July there was an agreement on the table. IBK could stay but he had to sack his prime minister and nominate a government of national unity in which M5 demanded control of several ministries, including education, though not defence or security. Dicko also agreed to let the president choose his prime minister. It was considered to be a decent deal but it fell apart at the last minute.
“France and the Ivory Coast refused to let Boubou Cissé go. They were adamant and so was IBK,” said a former minster who took part in the talks. Even more recently, in the hours just before the coup took place, a French diplomat explained to the leaders of M5 that they needed to abandon their idea of removing the prime minister. “Our position was: no resignation of IBK, and still less of Boubou Cissé,” confirmed an Élysée source.
Would the soldiers behind the coup have acted as they did if France had not intervened to save the prime minister, and if an agreement had been reached between IBK and the M5 opposition coalition? Several sources to whom Mediapart spoke think not. “They could never have done that if an agreement had been found, and given M5's high popularity in Mali,” said one negotiator. In fact, though the coup leaders do not seem to have discussed their plans with the leaders of the opposition, as Paris believes, they have since taken steps to meet them. “We have no link at all with M5-RFP,” said Colonel-Major Ismaël Wagué, spokesman for the self-styled National Committee for the Salvation of the People (CNSP). “On the other hand, their demands seem legitimate to us and we identify with their demands.”
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- The French version of this article can be found here.
English version by Michael Streeter