The outcome had been predicted. On December 4th, for only the second time in the history of France's Fifth Republic, a coalition of opposition parties came together to bring down a sitting government. But the Fifth Republic regime is no longer in its formative days or consolidating phase; now 66 years old, it is instead unravelling.
In an interview with Mediapart, Bruno Daugeron, professor of public law at Paris-Cité University, points out that, since Michel Barnier’s appointment as prime minister three months ago, the political classes have found themselves in terra incognita. According to him, the institutions of state have experienced nothing like the current situation since 1962 – the previous time a government was voted down.
For the author of Droit constitutionnel ('Constitutional Law', published by PUF in 2023), the solution lies not in another presidential election but in how to manage the role and electoral influence acquired by the far-right.
Enlargement : Illustration 1
Mediapart: This is the second time a motion of no confidence has succeeded in France. From a legal and political standpoint, what are the similarities and differences between the situations in 1962 and 2024?
Bruno Daugeron: From a procedural perspective, the outcome is the same: in both instances, a sitting government was forced to resign by MPs in the National Assembly.
There is, however, one difference. In 1962, Georges Pompidou was subjected to a spontaneous motion of no confidence brought by MPs under Article 49, paragraph 2 of the Constitution. General de Gaulle had just announced a referendum on electing the president by universal suffrage but had bypassed Parliament to do so, invoking Article 11 rather than Article 89 of the Constitution.
The Left, sections of the centre and the non-Gaullist Right saw this as a power grab and united to oust his prime minister, though they could not directly challenge de Gaulle himself. This year, Michel Barnier himself chose to trigger a no confidence vote in order to pass a bill [editor's note, in this case his budget] as provided for under Article 49, paragraph 3 of the Constitution.
The prime minister was no longer the product of the president’s will […]. But neither was he the product of a majority that was hostile to the president.
But politically the difference is huge. After the defeat and resignation of Pompidou, General de Gaulle decided to dissolve the National Assembly. Fresh elections then brought about what we now refer to as the “majority rule” era. Gaullist MPs secured an absolute majority and demonstrated discipline throughout the term of that Parliament from 1962 to 1967.
In contrast, no dissolution can follow Barnier’s fall and resignation. The President of the Republic must wait another seven months to exercise this right [editor's note, this is because he dissolved the National Assembly in June and has to wait 12 months before he can do so again]. He is therefore compelled to appoint someone else.
Mediapart: In an article published this summer, you highlighted the uniqueness of Michel Barnier's position. Can you elaborate on the unprecedented nature of this situation?
B.D.: Though it was a situation that was permitted under the Constitution, it was unlike any previous scenarios.
In the past, we've seen configurations of either majoritarian presidentialism or cohabitation. In the first case, a cohesive majority of MPs is committed to supporting the President of the Republic, through his prime minister, for the long term. In the second, the parliamentary majority no longer supports the president but instead backs the prime minister in opposition to the president - with equal loyalty. The “behavioural matrix” of the MPs is the same in both cases, just not in favour of the same person.
With the appointment of Michel Barnier, neither of these configurations applied. The prime minister was no longer the product of the president’s will, reinforced by a parliamentary majority. But neither was he the product of a majority that was hostile to the president. This's why I referred to it at the time as a “narrow path”.
Mediapart: Why did this narrow path fail?
B.D.: It worked at first, to some extent at least. While there was no overall majority, there were occasional ad hoc creations of majorities on a case-by-case basis. Laws and amendments were passed before Wednesday night’s motion of no confidence, for example on public broadcasting and inheritance rights.
The problem was that, without a predictable “behavioural matrix” of MPs in favour of Michel Barnier, he was vulnerable to a majority forming against him. This is precisely what happened with the budget: the two most polarised blocs on the right and left of the Assembly joined forces against him.
Mediapart: How does the current period illustrate the changes in the Fifth Republic that you explored in your latest book?
B.D.: The much-touted advantage of “majoritarian presidentialism”, briefly interrupted by periods of cohabitation, was its stability. The problem is that this stability was artificially produced by an electoral system that allowed a political group to win more than 50 percent of parliamentary seats with only 30 percent or less of the vote in the first round [editor's note, French parliamentary and presidential elections have two rounds of voting]. The downside was that this stifled the grievances and aspirations of large sections of the public, who were invited to vote once every five years and then put up with the consequences.
Relying on this system, those in power failed to recognise the rising discontent within society, which eventually overwhelmed them to the point that the mechanisms of stability were undermined. The prospect of the [far-right] Rassemblement National (RN) gaining power even led the presidential camp and the Left to deliberately break the amplification effect of the two-round electoral system through the mutual withdrawals [of candidates]. [Editor's note, this is what is known as the 'Republican front' to keep out parties and their candidates who are not deemed to be 'Republican'.] However, this cooperation did not continue when it came to Parliament itself.
The real challenge is managing the electoral influence acquired by the RN.
The result is that everything is now out of sync. The Fifth Republic was created to address a specific situation where there was no stable behavioural matrix among MPs. The system sought to enforce discipline, to the point where it ended in the “over-domination” of the executive, which could not be hindered in its ability to govern. That model no longer works, but no political actor is fully committing to an alternative logic. Such a shift would require compromises between established forces at a parliamentary and even governmental level.
Mediapart: On the Left, some see the solution in a “re-parliamentarisation” of the system - that's the option favoured by the Socialists - while others advocate an early presidential election (the preferred option of the radical-left La France Insoumise). What are your thoughts?
B.D.: I don't believe a new presidential election would resolve the crisis. Let's imagine that Emmanuel Macron resigns. If this happens before the summer, any successor would still have to contend with the current National Assembly until June. After that, it's true that a dissolution would be possible. But who's to say that the Assembly would emerge any different?
A president who defeats Marine Le Pen [editor's note, the RN's candidate at the last election] or [RN president] Jordan Bardella would likely have been elected by default, based on a negative mindset. This would only encourage the RN's electorate to turn out again in the parliamentary elections, potentially resulting in the same weakening “Republican front” and the same difficulties as today. Another scenario could see the RN win the presidency. In that case, either they would face a similarly fragmented Assembly that would prevent them from governing, or they might have a chance to get close to an absolute majority. That would, without a doubt, mark an entirely new era.
The real issue is how to manage the electoral influence that the RN has acquired. The heirs of Macronism or the Left might still claim they can reduce that influence and secure an absolute majority, but that's not the most likely scenario in the short term.
This leaves two options: either some groups break the “cordon sanitaire” and agree to truly integrate the RN and its allies into a governing coalition, or the constituent parts of the Republican front choose to cooperate within Parliament or even in government. Either way, it requires moving beyond a mindset that is solely partisan and exclusionary.
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- The original French version of thus interview can be found here.
English version by Michael Streeter